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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
Drunk driving is a dangerous and often deadly crime.  
“Approximately a quarter million people are injured annually 
in alcohol-related crashes,” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 
137, 156-57 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting), and the number 
“who are killed . . . by drunk drivers is far greater than the 
number of murders committed” during many other violent 
crimes, id. at 157 & n.4.  “[F]rom 1982 to 2016, alcohol-related 
accidents took roughly 10,000 to 20,000 lives in this Nation 
every single year.  In the best years, that would add up to more 
than one fatality per hour.”  Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 
2525, 2536 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). 
 
Today, we consider whether Pennsylvania’s driving 
under the influence (“DUI”) law, which makes a DUI at the 
highest blood alcohol content (“BAC”) a first-degree 
misdemeanor that carries a maximum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment, see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1104; 75 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 3802(c), 3803(b)(4), constitutes a serious crime 
4 
that requires disarmament.  Plaintiff Raymond Holloway, Jr., 
was convicted under this statute, and by the terms of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), he is prohibited from possessing a firearm.  
Holloway claims this prohibition violates his Second 
Amendment rights.  The District Court agreed and enjoined 
applying § 922(g)(1) to him.  Because Holloway was convicted 
of a serious crime as contemplated by Binderup v. Attorney 
General United States of America, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(en banc), applying § 922(g)(1) to him does not offend the 
Second Amendment.  Therefore, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of 
the Government.   
 
I 
 
In 2002, Holloway was convicted of a DUI at the 
highest BAC, but the charge was dismissed upon his 
completion of an accelerated rehabilitation program.  In 2005, 
Holloway was again arrested for driving under the influence 
and registered a BAC of 0.192%.  Holloway pled guilty to 
violating 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3802(c) for driving under 
the influence at the highest BAC (greater than 0.16%).  He 
received a sentence of 60 months’ “Intermediate Punishment,” 
including 90-days’ imprisonment that allowed him work 
release, a $1,500 fine, and mandatory drug and alcohol 
evaluation.   
 
In 2016, Holloway sought to purchase a firearm but was 
unable to do so because of his disqualifying DUI conviction.  
Holloway sued the Attorney General of the United States and 
other federal officials (the “Government”) in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
claiming that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him 
5 
and seeking declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.  The 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.   
 
The District Court granted Holloway’s motion for 
summary judgment, awarded him a declaratory judgment, and 
entered a permanent injunction barring the Government from 
enforcing § 922(g)(1) against him.  Holloway v. Sessions, 349 
F. Supp. 3d 451, 463 (M.D. Pa. 2018).  Applying Binderup, the 
Court held that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to 
Holloway because (1) Holloway’s DUI offense was a non-
serious crime that has not historically been a basis for the 
denial of Second Amendment rights, id. at 459-60, and (2) the 
Government failed to demonstrate that disarmament of 
individuals like Holloway would promote the public safety, 
particularly given his decade of crime-free behavior, id. at 460-
62.  The Government appeals.   
 
II1 
 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
review of a district court’s order granting summary judgment 
is plenary, Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 
413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013), and we view the facts and make all 
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor, Hugh v. 
Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
when the non-moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing 
on an essential element of her case with respect to which she 
6 
A 
 
The sole issue on appeal is whether applying 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1)2 to Holloway, which makes it unlawful for him to 
possess a firearm due to his prior conviction, violates his 
Second Amendment rights.   
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court 
held that the Second Amendment protects the right of “law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth 
and home.”  554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  This right, however, 
“is not unlimited.”  Id. at 626.  Indeed, the Court cautioned that 
“nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.”  Id.  The Court described the felon ban as just one 
“example[]” of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”  
Id. at 627 n.26. 
 
Since Heller, we have been called upon to determine 
whether various laws unlawfully infringe the Second 
Amendment.  Some of these laws regulate who can possess 
firearms, see, e.g., Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 155-
56 (3d Cir. 2019) (ban on possession by those adjudicated 
                                              
has the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 323 (1986). 
2 Section 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for any person 
convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
over one year” to possess a firearm.  Excluded from this 
definition is any crime “classified by the laws of the State as a 
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two 
years or less.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). 
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mentally defective or committed to mental institution); 
Binderup, 836 F.3d 336 (ban on possession by certain 
convicts).  Other laws regulate the type of firearms that may be 
possessed.  See, e.g., Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. 
v. Att’y Gen. N.J. (N.J. Rifle), 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(large capacity magazines).  In each instance, we examined the 
challenged law by applying the two-part test first articulated in 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Under that test, we first “ask whether the challenged law 
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s guarantee.”  Id. at 89.  “If it does not, 
our inquiry is complete.”  Id.  If it does, we move to the second 
step:  we evaluate the law under some form of heightened 
scrutiny.  See id. at 96-97.    
 
After Marzzarella, we addressed a constitutional 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 
168 (3d Cir. 2011).  Barton recognized that § 922(g)(1) was 
one of the “presumptively lawful” measures referenced in 
Heller, id. at 172, but that individuals could challenge 
§ 922(g)(1) on an as-applied basis, id. at 173.  Barton, 
however, did not expressly apply Marzzarella’s two-step 
framework.  Id.  Rather, Barton held that a challenger could 
rebut the presumption that § 922(g)(1) constitutionally applied 
to him by “present[ing] facts about himself and his background 
that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons 
historically barred from Second Amendment protections.”  Id. 
at 174.  The “historically barred” class, Barton concluded, was 
individuals “likely to commit violent offenses.”  Id. at 173-74.  
Thus, Barton held that if an individual could show that he 
posed no threat of future violence, then § 922(g)(1) could not 
constitutionally apply to him.  Id. at 174.      
8 
We revisited Barton and as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1) as an en banc Court in Binderup.  Binderup 
resulted in several opinions from fifteen judges: (1) an opinion 
by Judge Ambro, joined in full by two judges and joined 
additionally in part by four other judges; (2) an opinion by 
Judge Hardiman, joined in full by four judges, and which 
concurred in part with Judge Ambro and concurred in the 
judgment; and (3) an opinion by Judge Fuentes, joined by six 
judges (some of whom joined parts of Judge Ambro’s opinion), 
which concurred in part, dissented in part, and dissented from 
the judgment.   
 
There are no specific rules for how to identify the 
holdings and legal standards from split circuit opinions.  We 
can, however, look to the rules we use to identify such 
standards in fractured Supreme Court opinions, as set forth in 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), and its progeny.3  
We need not conduct an explicit Marks analysis of the 
Binderup opinions here because we already recited its 
holdings, as expressed by Judge Ambro’s controlling opinion, 
in Beers, 927 F.3d at 155-56;4 see also N.J. Rifle, 910 F.3d at 
                                              
3 Marks is often applied by judges who did not 
participate in the opinion being reviewed.  In this case, fourteen 
of the fifteen judges who participated in Binderup remain on 
our Court and know what it held and did not hold. 
4 In Beers, we explained that at step one of Binderup, “a 
challenger ‘must (1) identify the traditional justifications for 
excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of 
which he appears to be a member, and then (2) present facts 
about himself and his background that distinguish his 
circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred 
class.’”  927 F.3d at 155 (quoting Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346-
9 
130 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (describing Judge Ambro’s 
Binderup opinion as the “controlling opinion”), and it binds 
us.5  Mateo v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 870 F.3d 228, 231 n.6 (3d Cir. 
                                              
47).  “If a challenger passes these two hurdles, ‘the burden 
shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the regulation 
satisfies some form of heightened scrutiny[.]’”  Id. (quoting 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 347).  Beers further explained that 
Binderup overruled Barton in large part and “[w]here the 
historical justification for disarming felons was because they 
had committed serious crimes, risk of violent recidivism was 
irrelevant, ‘and the seriousness of the purportedly 
disqualifying offense is our sole focus throughout 
Marzzarella’s first step.’”  Id. at 156 (quoting Binderup, 836 
F.3d at 350) (emphasis omitted). 
5 Although Beers did not explicitly conduct a Marks 
analysis, Beers set forth the Binderup majority holdings.  In 
Marks, the Supreme Court held that when “no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds.”  430 U.S. at 193 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  Marks expresses one way to identify a 
holding from among separate opinions.  The Supreme Court 
has adopted other approaches for examining fractured opinions 
to identify the rule or rules a majority endorsed.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 n.12 (1984) 
(“[T]he disagreement between the majority and the dissenters 
in [a previous] case with respect to the [application of law to 
fact] is less significant than the agreement on the standard to 
be applied . . . .”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 17 (1983) (“[T]he Court of Appeals 
correctly recognized that the four dissenting Justices and 
10 
2017) (prior panel’s precedential opinion “binding on 
subsequent panels”); see also Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 
157, 165 n.10 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying a legal standard derived 
from a previous panel opinion’s Marks analysis as the law of 
our Circuit). 
 
Nevertheless, both Beers and Marks reveal the 
following relevant Binderup holdings agreed to by a majority 
of judges: 
 
(1) Marzzarella’s two-step test—and not the test 
articulated in Barton—governs Second Amendment 
                                              
Justice Blackmun formed a majority to require application of 
the Colorado River test.”).   Whatever the test, “our goal in 
analyzing a fractured [opinion] is to find ‘a single legal 
standard . . . [that] when properly applied, produce[s] results 
with which a majority of justices in the case articulating the 
standard would agree.’ . . . To that end, we have looked to the 
votes of dissenting justices if they, combined with the votes 
from plurality or concurring opinions, establish a majority 
view on the relevant issue.”  United States v. Donovan, 661 
F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), modified 
on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)) (first alteration added); 
see also Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115-17 (deriving the rule 
established in a particular case by combining one opinion that 
garnered two votes with the opinion of the four dissenters); 
B.H. ex rel Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 310 
(3d Cir. 2013) (stating that we have “count[ed] even dissenting 
justices’ votes that, by definition,” did not concur in the 
judgment to identify a majority’s holding). 
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challenges, 836 F.3d at 346-47 (Ambro, J.); id. at 387 (Fuentes, 
J.);6  
 
(2) At Marzzarella step one for challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1), we determine whether an individual has 
committed a “serious” offense, and thus was an “unvirtuous 
citizen[]” who was historically barred from possessing 
firearms and fell out of the Second Amendment’s scope, id. at 
348-49 (Ambro, J.); id. at 387 (Fuentes, J.);7 
                                              
6 Chief Judge Smith and Judge Greenaway, Jr., joined 
Judge Ambro’s opinion in its entirety, for a total of three 
judges.  Then-Chief Judge McKee and Judges Vanaskie, 
Shwartz, Krause, Restrepo, and Roth joined Judge Fuentes for 
a total of seven judges.  Thus, any agreement between Judge 
Ambro’s and Judge Fuentes’ opinions represents agreement by 
ten judges.   
Judges Fuentes, Vanaskie, Krause, and Roth also 
“expressly” joined the portions of Judge Ambro’s opinion 
laying out the framework for as-applied challenges, for a total 
of seven judges.  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 339 n.1 (Ambro, J.); 
id. at 387 n.72 (Fuentes, J.).  Judges McKee, Shwartz, and 
Restrepo did not “expressly” join Judge Ambro’s opinion 
“because they reject[ed] the notion that the Marzzarella 
framework can be reconciled with any aspect of Barton’s as-
applied Second Amendment analysis, which they would 
overrule entirely.”  Id. at 339 n.1 (Ambro, J.).  Thus, ten 
Binderup judges rejected Barton and held that Marzzarella’s 
framework governs as-applied challenges. 
7 Although Judge Ambro, joined by two judges, 
disagreed with Judge Fuentes, joined by six judges, over “how 
to decide whether any particular crime is serious enough” to 
warrant disarmament, 836 F.3d at 388 (Fuentes, J.) (emphasis 
12 
(3) Barton’s focus on whether the challenger’s crime 
was violent or whether the challenger poses a threat of violence 
is overruled, id. at 348-49 (Ambro, J.); id. at 387 n.72 (Fuentes, 
J.); 
 
 (4) a challenger, otherwise barred from possession by 
§ 922(g)(1), can make a factual showing that he falls outside 
of the historically barred class, id. at 347 & n.3, 349 (Ambro, 
J.); id. at 365-67 (Hardiman, J.);8  
 
 (5) intermediate scrutiny applies at Marzzarella step 
two, id. at 353 (Ambro, J.); id. at 396-97 (Fuentes, J.).9 
                                              
omitted), a total of ten judges agreed that the correct test at step 
one for challenges to § 922(g)(1) is whether the offense is 
“serious,” not whether the offense is violent, and thus 
overruled Barton’s focus on violence for this inquiry. 
8 Judges Fisher, Chagares, Jordan, and Nygaard joined 
Judge Hardiman’s opinion for a total of five judges. 
9 Our dissenting colleague agrees that a majority in 
Binderup: (1) rejected the idea that the Second Amendment 
excludes only those who commit violent offenses and that, 
because that majority adopted the “virtuous citizenry” theory 
of serious offenses, the Second Amendment excludes “any 
person who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent 
or nonviolent,” Dissenting Op. at 2; Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 
(Ambro, J.); id. at 388-91 (Fuentes, J.); (2) held that we 
evaluate § 922(g)(1) under intermediate scrutiny, not strict 
scrutiny, Dissenting Op. at 24; Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353 
(Ambro, J.); id. at 398 (Fuentes, J.); and (3) held that Barton 
was overruled to the extent it suggested that (a) the Second 
Amendment excludes only those who commit violent 
offenses, id. at 348-49 (Ambro, J.); id. at 388-91 (Fuentes, J.), 
13 
Thus, as we said in Beers, 927 F.3d at 155, Binderup 
held that “the two-step Marzzarella framework controls all 
Second Amendment challenges, including as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(1),” 836 F.3d at 356 (Ambro, J.).  At 
step one, the challenger must “identify the traditional 
justifications for excluding from Second Amendment 
protections the class of which he appears to be a member[.]”  
Id. at 347.  When the class at issue is historically excluded 
convicts, as here and in Binderup, the challenger must show 
that he was not previously convicted of a serious crime.  Id. at 
350.  A crime is “serious” based on circumstances related to 
the offense, id. at 350-53, and so evidence of a challenger’s 
rehabilitation or his likelihood of recidivism is not relevant, id. 
at 349-50.  There are no fixed rules for determining whether an 
offense is serious but various factors may be informative 
including, but not limited to, whether the crime poses a danger 
or risk of harm to self or others, whether the crime involves 
violence or threatened violence, the classification of the 
offense, the maximum penalty, the penalty imposed, and how 
other jurisdictions view the crimes.  See id. at 351-52.10  If a 
                                              
(b) “the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation will 
restore the Second Amendment rights of people who 
committed serious crimes,” id. at 349 (Ambro, J.); id. at 339 
n.1, or (c) that strict scrutiny rather than intermediate scrutiny 
applies at step two of the Marzzarella framework, id. at 
353, id. at 398 (Fuentes, J.); Dissenting Op. at 2, 6, 24. 
10 In Binderup, Judge Ambro considered: (1) whether 
the crime of conviction was classified as a misdemeanor or 
felony, (2) whether the criminal offense involves violence or 
attempted violence as an element, (3) the sentence imposed, 
and (4) whether there is a cross-jurisdictional consensus as to 
the seriousness of the crime.  See 836 F.3d at 351-52. 
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challenger makes a “strong” showing that the regulation 
burdens his Second Amendment rights and that he has not 
committed a “serious” crime, and thus is different from those 
historically barred from possessing firearms, then “the burden 
shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the regulation 
satisfies” intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 347.  
 
We apply this framework to determine whether 
§ 922(g)(1) as applied to Holloway violates his Second 
Amendment rights. 
 
B 
 
At the first step of the analysis, we must determine 
whether the application of § 922(g)(1) burdens Holloway’s 
Second Amendment rights by considering the traditional 
justifications for denying certain criminals Second 
Amendment rights and then examining whether Holloway’s 
offense is disqualifying.  We “presume the judgment of the 
legislature is correct and treat any crime subject to § 922(g)(1) 
as disqualifying unless there is a strong reason to do 
otherwise.”  Id. at 351. 
 
                                              
No majority of judges in Binderup agreed on how to 
determine whether a particular offense is serious.  That said, 
we have viewed, albeit in a non-precedential opinion, Judge 
Ambro’s factors as providing data points for determining 
whether a challenger’s prior conviction was serious, King v. 
Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F. App’x 111, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2019), and 
we agree with the dissent that a multifactor test should be used 
to identify whether an offense is serious, at least as to 
misdemeanor offenses, Dissenting Op. at 6.       
15 
1 
 
As previously stated, Heller embraced the 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.”  554 U.S. at 626.  Because Holloway’s DUI 
misdemeanor conviction carries a maximum penalty of five 
years’ imprisonment, it is deemed a disqualifying felony under 
§ 922(g)(1).  Thus, the application of § 922(g)(1) is 
presumptively lawful.  See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 (Ambro, 
J.).   
 
2 
 
 We next examine whether Holloway’s crime was 
nonetheless “not serious enough to strip [him] of [his] Second 
Amendment rights.”  Id. at 351.  Under Binderup, “a person 
who did not commit a serious crime retains his Second 
Amendment rights,” because “a non-serious crime does not 
demonstrate a lack of ‘virtue’ that disqualifies an offender from 
exercising those rights.”  Id. at 349.     
 
A crime that presents a potential for danger and risk of 
harm to self and others is “serious.”11  See “Serious,” Black’s 
                                              
11 The dissent asserts that our consideration of an 
offense’s dangerousness steps too far from Barton.  Dissenting 
Op. at 16-17.  Barton, however, has been overruled in nearly 
all respects.  Among other things, seven Binderup judges 
agreed that Barton “defines too narrowly the traditional 
justification for why a criminal conviction may destroy the 
right to arms (i.e., it limits felon disarmament to only those 
criminals likely to commit a violent crime in the future) and, 
by extension, defines too broadly the class of offenders who 
16 
                                              
may bring successful as-applied Second Amendment 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) (i.e., it allows people convicted of 
serious crimes to regain their right to arms).”  836 F.3d at 347 
n.3 (Ambro, J.).  Three other judges would have overruled 
Barton entirely.  Id. at 339 n.1.  Thus, ten judges rejected the 
dissent’s argument that our considerations of who falls within 
the historically barred class must be tied to Barton, and in 
particular, “the presence of force or violence in the 
challenger’s conduct.”  Dissenting Op. at 16-17. 
Instead of Barton’s exclusive focus on violence, 
Binderup instructs that the Founders sought to permit only the 
virtuous citizen to possess a firearm.  The historical record tells 
us that those who present a risk of danger lack virtue and the 
Founders considered danger in evaluating who had the right to 
bear arms.  See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348-49 (Ambro, J.); id. 
at 389-91 (Fuentes, J.).   
First, The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the 
Minority of the Convention of the States of Pennsylvania to 
Their Constituents (the “Address”), “a ‘highly influential’ 
‘precursor’ to the Second Amendment,” Binderup, 836 F.3d at 
349 (Ambro, J.) (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 
638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) and Heller, 554 U.S. at 604), 
stated “no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any 
of them unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public 
injury from individuals,” United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 
1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting the Address, 
reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, 2 The Bill of Rights: A 
Documentary History 662, 665 (1971)); see also Binderup, 836 
F.3d at 349 (quoting same passage).  While the dissent 
proposes a narrow reading of the broad language “real danger 
of public injury,” Dissenting Op. at 13-15, we precedentially 
interpreted the Address to indicate that the legislature could 
17 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “serious” as, among 
other things, “dangerous; potentially resulting in death or other 
severe consequences”).  “There is no question that drunk 
driving is a serious and potentially deadly crime . . . . The 
                                              
historically disarm those “considered dangerous to themselves 
and/or to the public at large,” Beers, 927 F.3d at 158.  The 
dissent’s read is thus foreclosed by our precedent.     
Second, Samuel Adams’ proposed language for the 
Second Amendment would have expressly limited the right to 
“peaceable citizens.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 367 (Hardiman, 
J.) (quoting Journal of Convention: Wednesday February 6, 
1788, reprinted in Debates and Proceedings in the Convention 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Held in the Year 1788, 
at 86 (Boston, William White 1856)) (emphasis omitted).  In 
Adams’ time, “peaceable” meant “free from tumult;” “quiet; 
undisturbed;” “[n]ot violent; not bloody;” “[n]ot quarrelsome; 
not turbulent.”  1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English 
Language (5th ed. 1773).  Relatedly, “[b]reaches of the peace 
comprise[d] not only cases of actual violence to the person of 
another, but any unlawful acts, tending to produce an actual 
breach of the peace; whether the peace of the public, or an 
individual, be in fact disturbed or not.”  Pearce v. Atwood, 13 
Mass. 324, 332 (1816).  From these sources, judges have 
concluded that “founding-era legislatures categorically 
disarmed groups whom they judged to be a threat to the public 
safety.”  Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 458 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(Barrett, J., dissenting).  Thus, the Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts proposals show that any right to bear arms did 
not extend to those who posed a danger to the public.  These 
historical sources therefore support considering risk of danger 
in determining whether an offense constitutes a serious crime 
that deprives an offender of Second Amendment protection. 
18 
imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers exceeds that 
at issue in other types of cases.”  Virginia v. Harris, 558 U.S. 
978, 979-80 (2009) (Mem.) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting from 
denial of writ of certiorari); see Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2541 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[D]runk driving poses significant 
dangers that [states] must be able to curb.”); Begay, 553 U.S. 
at 141 (“Drunk driving is an extremely dangerous crime.”).   
 
All three branches of the federal government have 
recognized as much.  The Supreme Court has described 
individuals “who drive with a BAC significantly above 
the . . . limit of 0.08% and recidivists” as “the most dangerous 
offenders.”  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2179 
(2016).  Congress and the Executive Branch have also 
recognized the dangers posed by drunk driving.  Congress 
requires states to implement highway safety programs “to 
reduce injuries and deaths resulting from persons driving 
motor vehicles while impaired by alcohol.”  23 U.S.C. 
§ 402(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The Secretary of Transportation 
conditions the receipt of certain highway-related funds on 
states’ implementation of programs with impaired driving 
countermeasures that will “effective[ly]” “reduce driving 
under the influence of alcohol.”  § 405(a)(3), (d).  Thus, all 
branches of the federal government agree that DUIs are 
dangerous, and those who present a danger may be disarmed.   
 
While use or the threatened use of violence is not an 
element of a DUI offense, see 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3802(c) (providing “[a]n individual may not drive, operate or 
be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after 
imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol 
concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or 
higher”), a showing of violence is not necessary for a crime to 
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be deemed serious, see, e.g., Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 
(Ambro, J.); id. at 390-91 (Fuentes, J.); Medina v. Whitaker, 
913 F.3d 152, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (holding that fraud, by 
lying on mortgage documents, is “a serious crime”).  Thus, the 
fact that an offense does not include the use or threatened use 
of violence does not mean it is not serious.   
 
Moreover, though labeled as a first-degree 
misdemeanor, Holloway’s DUI crime carries a three-month 
mandatory minimum prison term and a five-year maximum 
prison term.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1104; 75 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3803(b)(4); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3804(c)(2).  
While “generally the misdemeanor label . . . in the Second 
Amendment context, is . . . important” and is a “powerful 
expression” of the state legislature’s view, it is not dispositive.  
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 352.  First, not only is the distinction 
“minor and often arbitrary,” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
14 (1985); see also Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 132 
(2008), some states do not use the distinction at all, see, e.g., 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4 (dividing offenses into “crimes,” 
“disorderly persons offenses,” and “petty disorderly persons 
offenses”); § 2C:43-1(a) (dividing “crimes” further into four 
degrees); State v. Doyle, 200 A.2d 606, 613 (N.J. 1964) 
(“Criminal codes in New Jersey have not utilized the felony-
misdemeanor nomenclature or classification of the English 
common law.”).  Second, “numerous misdemeanors involve 
conduct more dangerous than many felonies.”  Garner, 471 
U.S. at 14.  Indeed, giving dispositive weight to the 
felony/misdemeanor nomenclature for determining whether an 
offense is serious would mean that the following offenses, 
labeled under Pennsylvania law as misdemeanors and carrying 
a five-year maximum penalty (the maximum Holloway faced), 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1104(1), would not qualify as serious 
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crimes: involuntary manslaughter, § 2504(b), terrorism, 
§ 2717(b)(1), assaulting a child, § 2701(b)(2), abusing a care-
dependent person, § 2713.1(b)(1), making terroristic threats, 
§ 2706(d), threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, 
§ 2715(b)(1), shooting a fire bomb into public transportation, 
§ 2707(a), indecent assault by forcible compulsion, 
§ 3126(a)(2), concealing the murder of a child, § 4303(a), 
luring a child into a motor vehicle or structure, § 2910(a), 
restraining a person “in circumstances exposing him to risk of 
serious bodily injury,” § 2902(a)(1), and stalking, 
§ 2709.1(c)(1).   At bottom, Heller emphasized that the Second 
Amendment right belongs to “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens,” 554 U.S. at 635, and whether labeled a felon or 
misdemeanant, those who commit serious crimes are not “the 
kinds of ‘law-abiding’ citizens whose rights Heller 
vindicated,” Binderup, 836 F.3d at 392 (Fuentes, J.). 
 
Furthermore, the maximum penalty that may be 
imposed often reveals how the legislature views an offense.12  
                                              
12 In addition to ascribing high value to the offense’s 
felony/misdemeanor label, the dissent favors focusing on the 
actual penalty imposed.   While the penalty imposed may 
provide some insight into how a sentencing judge may have 
viewed an offender, it does not necessarily reflect how the 
offense itself is viewed.  Binderup step one focuses on the 
offense and not the offender.  See 856 F.3d at 349-50 (Ambro, 
J.); id. at 388 (Fuentes, J.).  Because the actual sentence 
imposed can be influenced by many factors, such as 
cooperation, U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, acceptance of responsibility, 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and offender-related variances, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553, the actual penalty imposed does not necessarily show 
that the crime was not “serious.”  Instead, the maximum 
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Put succinctly, “the maximum possible punishment is certainly 
probative of a misdemeanor’s seriousness.”  Id. at 352 (Ambro, 
J.).13  “[T]he category of serious crimes changes over time as 
legislative judgments regarding virtue evolve,” id. at 351, and 
here, the Pennsylvania legislature has demonstrated an 
evolution in judgment.  Pennsylvania’s DUI laws were 
                                              
punishment is a more appropriate data point because it 
provides insight into how a state legislature views a crime—
not how a sentencing judge views an individual.  See Lewis v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1996) (noting that an 
offense’s penalty “reveals the legislature’s judgment about the 
offense’s severity”); id. at 328 (noting that the maximum 
punishment is an “objective indication of the seriousness with 
which society regards the offense”); Binderup, 836 F.3d at 
351-52.  For these reasons, it is proper to consider the 
maximum penalty an offender faces, and not simply the actual 
punishment imposed or whether the offense is designated as a 
misdemeanor or felony, to determine whether an offense is 
properly viewed as “serious.” 
13 The dissent is mistaken to say that a majority in 
Binderup rejected consideration of a maximum penalty in 
favor of the felony/misdemeanor label.  Judge Ambro’s 
opinion for three judges reasoned that “the maximum possible 
punishment is certainly probative of a misdemeanor’s 
seriousness” under the first factor.  836 F.3d at 352 (Ambro, 
J.).  Seven judges stated that any crime which qualifies for 
§ 922(g)(1) is serious.  Id. at 388 (Fuentes, J.).  That means that 
those seven judges would conclude that the penalty Holloway 
faced shows his offense is serious regardless of its 
misdemeanor classification.  Combining the views of Judge 
Ambro’s and Judge Fuentes’ opinions, a majority of the 
Binderup court rejected the dissent’s view. 
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amended in 2003 when state legislators observed that “[t]oo 
many people have been injured and killed on our highways,” 
H.R. Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1443 (Pa. 
2003) (statement of Rep. Turzai), and unlike in other states, 
which saw an eleven percent decrease in deaths caused by 
drunk drivers, such deaths “continue to rise” in Pennsylvania 
with a five percent increase, H.R. Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1444 (Pa. 2003) (statement of Rep. 
Harper); S. Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 981 
(Pa. 2003) (statement of Sen. Williams).  At the time of the 
amendment, thirteen individuals were killed every two weeks 
in Pennsylvania from alcohol-related accidents.  H.R. Legis. 
Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1445 (Pa. 2003) 
(statement of Rep. Harper).  “[M]ore than half of all fatal 
alcohol-related accidents [were] caused by hardcore drunken 
drivers, those people whose BACs are .16 or above,” H.R. 
Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1444 (Pa. 
2003) (statement of Rep. Harper), and “one-third of drunk 
driving arrests involve[d] repeat offenders,” S. Legis. Journal, 
187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 981 (Pa. 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Williams).  To address this “very serious matter,” H.R. 
Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.1445 (Pa. 2003) 
(statement of Rep. Harper), the legislature “provid[ed] for 
tough civil and criminal penalties together with mandatory 
treatment,” H.R. Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. 1443 (Pa. 2003) (statement of Rep. Turzai), to “mak[e] it 
clear that if you are under the influence of alcohol or drugs and 
behind the wheel in Pennsylvania, you will be punished,” H.R. 
Legis. Journal, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1445 (Pa. 
2003) (statement of Rep. Harper).  Therefore, despite the 
misdemeanor label, Pennsylvania’s decision to impose a 
mandatory minimum jail term and a maximum penalty of up to 
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five years’ imprisonment for a second DUI at the highest BAC 
reflects the seriousness of the offense.14   
 
Holloway received the statutory minimum sentence of 
90 days’ imprisonment, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3804(c)(2), 
and although he was permitted to work, he received a custodial 
sentence unlike either of the challengers in Binderup.  836 F.3d 
at 352 (“With not a single day of jail time, the punishments 
here reflect the sentencing judges’ assessment of how minor 
the violations were.”).  The legislature’s mandate that repeat 
DUI offenders receive at least three months in jail reflects its 
judgment that such offenses are serious.   
 
                                              
14 As one district court analyzing an as-applied 
challenge under Binderup aptly observed,  
 
juxtaposing the Pennsylvania legislature’s use of 
the misdemeanor label with the legislature’s 
simultaneous imposition of a substantial 
imprisonment term creates an inherent 
contradiction: a five-year maximum prison term 
suggests that [the plaintiff’s] predicate offense is 
serious, while the misdemeanor label 
simultaneously undercuts the apparent severity 
by labeling the offense a non-serious. 
 
Laudenslager v. Sessions, 4:17-CV-00330, 2019 WL 587298, 
at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2019) (discussing the classification 
and maximum sentence for receiving stolen property under 
Pennsylvania law).  We agree, and for the reasons described 
above, conclude that the legislative history elucidates this 
contradiction.   
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Pennsylvania is not alone in its decision to severely 
punish repeat DUI offenders.  Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2536 
(“[M]any States . . . have passed laws imposing increased 
penalties for recidivists or for drivers with a BAC level that 
exceeds a higher threshold.” (citations omitted)).  Although 
most states do not impose penalties for second DUI offenses 
that subject an offender to disarmament under § 922(g)(1), 
three states impose penalties that subject misdemeanants who 
commit a second DUI at a higher BAC to § 922(g)(1) 
disarmament.  Moreover, several states grade a second DUI 
offense as a felony, thus triggering disarmament.  The absence 
of a cross-jurisdictional consensus regarding the punishment 
for such conduct does not mean the conduct is not serious.  
Indeed, states unanimously agree that DUIs are crimes subject 
to punishment.  
 
Holloway suggests that his crimes cannot be so serious 
to justify federal disarmament and that to apply § 922(g)(1) to 
him would be overinclusive because Pennsylvania law only 
disarms DUI offenders at their third offense and permits them 
to apply for relief after ten years.  This argument ignores the 
gradations in Pennsylvania’s DUI laws.  In fact, 
Pennsylvania’s prohibition may be broader than § 922(g)(1) 
because it applies to all DUIs under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3802, regardless of punishment.  For example, an individual 
who commits a third DUI, none at the high or highest BAC, 
within a five-year period, is convicted of a second-degree 
misdemeanor under 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3803(a)(2) and 
subject to up to two years’ imprisonment under 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 1104(2).  This individual’s third DUI triggers 
Pennsylvania’s disarmament statute under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 6105(c), but does not trigger § 922(g)(1) because it falls 
within § 921(a)(20)(B)’s exception for state misdemeanors 
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subject to a term of imprisonment of two years or less.  
Holloway’s second DUI, however, subjects him to the federal 
provision but not the state provision because his offense was at 
the highest BAC, which enhanced the grading of his offense to 
a first-degree misdemeanor and exposed him to five years’ 
imprisonment.  Thus, Pennsylvania’s disarmament statute 
captures offenders who may not face § 922(g)(1)’s bar and 
shows that Pennsylvania meant to disarm a broader swath of 
offenders than § 922(g)(1).  
 
Together, these considerations demonstrate that 
Holloway’s DUI conviction constitutes a serious crime, 
placing him within the class of “persons historically excluded 
from Second Amendment protections.”  Binderup, 836 F.3d at 
347.  Because Holloway has not met his burden at the first step 
of the analysis to overcome the presumptive application of 
§ 922(g)(1),15 § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him, 
and he is not entitled to relief.16 
                                              
15 At the first step of our framework, we do not consider 
Holloway’s arguments that he has not committed any offenses 
since 2005 or the letters he offered in support of his character 
because “[t]here is no historical support for the view that the 
passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation can restore 
Second Amendment rights that were forfeited.”  Binderup, 836 
F.3d at 350, 354 n.7.   
16 Because Holloway has not carried his burden at step 
one to show he was not convicted of a serious offense, we need 
not move on to step two to determine whether the statute as 
applied to him survives intermediate scrutiny.  We do note, 
however, that our precedent is cautious in applying the 
intermediate scrutiny test used in First Amendment cases.  
Compare N.J. Rifle, 910 F.3d at 122 n.28 (stating that we do 
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III 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order 
granting Holloway summary judgment, a declaratory 
judgment, and an injunction and remand for the entry of 
judgment in favor of the Government.   
                                              
not incorporate “wholesale” First Amendment jurisprudence 
when evaluating Second Amendment challenges), with 
Dissenting Op. at 26 (advocating that we import the Supreme 
Court’s test for commercial speech cases for Second 
Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1)).  In addition, the 
dissent’s application of intermediate scrutiny seemingly asks 
for a near-perfect fit between the challenged regulation and the 
objective, rather than a “reasonable” fit.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 98 (stating that the “fit between the challenged regulation 
and the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect”). 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Driving under the influence of alcohol is undoubtedly a 
significant offense deserving of punishment. Yet the principal 
question in this case is not whether that offense is “serious” in 
the abstract or even as a matter of ordinary understanding. 
“Seriousness” here has a discrete legal meaning—that a 
conviction of the crime deprives in perpetuity an individual of 
an enumerated constitutional right. Under our precedent, these 
two categories are distinct, and they must be treated as such. 
Just because this question arises under the Second Amendment 
does not make our decision any less weighty. If the 
circumstances were different, we would assuredly consider 
very carefully the legal standard for depriving an individual of 
his right to free speech. The majority incorrectly, in my view, 
holds that Holloway has not carried his burden at Step One of 
the two-step framework established in United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). Further, because I 
conclude that at Step Two, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied 
here does not survive intermediate scrutiny, I must respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
Under the Marzzarella framework, we first determine 
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct 
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee.” 614 F.3d at 89. In particular, our precedent requires 
the challenger to satisfy the two elements articulated in United 
States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). He must “identify 
the traditional justifications for excluding from Second 
Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a 
member,” and then “present facts about himself and his 
background that distinguish his circumstances from those of 
persons in the historically barred class.” Binderup v. Attorney 
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Gen. United States of America, 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (citing Barton, 633 F.3d at 
173-74); see id. at 366 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgments); see also Beers v. Attorney Gen. 
United States of America, 927 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(adopting this test for an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(4)). 
In Binderup, ten judges on the fifteen-member en banc 
court agreed that, in the context of as-applied challenges to 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the “historically barred class” is those who 
are “unvirtuous” because they have “committed a serious 
criminal offense, violent or nonviolent.” 836 F.3d at 348 
(plurality opinion); see id. at 387 (Fuentes, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgments); see 
also United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 
2011) (noting that when this Circuit confronts a fractured 
decision, we “look[] to the votes of dissenting [judges] if they, 
combined with votes from plurality or concurring opinions, 
establish a majority view on the relevant issue”). 
“Seriousness”—and by extension “unvirtuousness”—
therefore has no independent legal significance. It is a gloss on 
the first part of the Barton test—a way of describing the 
offenses committed by those historically barred from 
possessing a firearm.1 
                                              
1 The majority suggests that any discussion of Barton is 
misplaced because that decision “has been overruled in nearly 
all respects.” Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.11. Yet, even if that is 
true, my emphasis throughout this opinion is on a key respect 
in which it has not been overruled: that a challenger to the 
application of § 922(g)(1) must distinguish his circumstances 
from those of the historically barred class. The majority 
acknowledges that we must still conduct such an analysis. See 
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The principal question before us today concerns the 
application of Barton’s second prong in the § 922(g)(1) 
context—that is, how to evaluate whether a challenger’s crime 
is sufficiently similar to crimes of the historically barred class 
such that he is not entitled to Second Amendment protection. 
The Binderup Court divided on this issue, and, for the reasons 
detailed below, it remains an open question whether the 
multifactor test used in Binderup is binding precedent in our 
Circuit—despite the lower courts’ application of it as such. See, 
e.g., Williams v. Barr, 379 F. Supp. 3d 360, 370-74 (E.D. Pa. 
2019); Holloway v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 451, 457-60 
(M.D. Pa. 2018). Nevertheless, for reasons I also state, the test 
is an appropriate means under our precedent of determining 
whether a challenger’s crime is “serious” for purposes of 
Marzzarella Step One. 
It is on this latter point—the application of the 
multifactor test—that I break with my colleagues in the 
majority. They interpret the test’s list of factors to be non-
exhaustive, Majority Op. at II.A, and so they supplement their 
analysis of the factors with additional considerations. The 
majority appears to concede that at least three of the four 
Binderup factors are in Holloway’s favor, but still concludes 
that Holloway is not entitled to Second Amendment protection. 
Although I agree that we are not bound to consider the four 
factors exclusively, I disagree with my colleagues in how they 
have applied and supplemented those factors. Simply because 
our precedent does not require us to apply the four factors alone 
does not mean the determination of “seriousness” is open to 
                                              
id. at II.A & n.4; see also Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346-47 
(plurality opinion) (“At step one of the Marzzarella decision 
tree, a challenger must prove, per Barton, that a presumptively 
lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment rights.”). 
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any legal content. Our precedent does require us to follow the 
doctrinal structure established in Barton and adopted in 
Binderup. The “seriousness” inquiry is a comparison of the 
challenger’s circumstances with those of the historically barred 
class. The majority’s analysis, in my view, diverges too far 
from this requirement. 
A 
As it was applied in Binderup, the multifactor test 
contains four factors for determining whether an individual’s 
crime is sufficiently “serious” to deprive him of his Second 
Amendment right. First, the court considers whether the state 
classifies the challenger’s disqualifying crime under § 
922(g)(1) as a felony or a misdemeanor. 836 F.3d at 351 
(opinion of Ambro, J.). Second, it determines whether the 
challenger’s crime “had the use or attempted use of force as an 
element.” Id. at 352. Third, also relevant is the sentence the 
challenger in fact received. Although the maximum possible 
sentence determines whether the crime triggers the § 922(g)(1) 
bar, the crime’s “seriousness” for purposes of Second 
Amendment analysis turns, in part, on the challenger’s actual 
punishment. Finally, the court considers whether there exists a 
“cross-jurisdictional consensus regarding the seriousness of 
the [challenger’s] crimes.” Id. Although this multifactor test 
garnered the support of only three judges, it was declared “the 
law of our Circuit” under the Supreme Court’s Marks rule. Id. 
at 356. 
My review of our case law leads me to question this 
conclusion. Courts and legal scholars disagree as to the nature 
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of the Marks rule and how it is to be applied.2 In particular, 
there are multiple possible versions of the rule, and the 
Supreme Court’s most recent statement on the matter 
acknowledged but declined to resolve this debate. See Hughes 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1771-72 (2018). On my 
assessment, the multifactor test would be Circuit precedent 
under only one of these versions,3 and our Court has not 
adopted this interpretation of the Marks rule above the others.4 
                                              
2 See Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 1942, 1947-65 (2019) (providing a helpful survey of the 
Marks debate). 
3 This version holds that the concurring opinion representing 
the views of the median judge constitutes binding precedent. 
See Re, supra, at 1977 (citing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (2000)). 
4 In fact, we have occasionally endorsed a different version of 
the rule, which construes it to apply only to those views in an 
opinion concurring in the judgment that constitute a logical 
subset of broader views expressed in another concurrence in 
the judgment. See, e.g., B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area Sch. 
Dist., 725 F.3d 293, 310-13 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc); Jackson 
v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Marks 
framework applies where one opinion is clearly ‘narrower’ 
than another, that is, where one opinion would always lead to 
the same result that a broader opinion would reach.”); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693-94 (3d Cir. 
1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992); see also Re, supra, at 1980-84 (explaining 
this version of the Marks rule). Under this version of the rule, 
the multifactor test would have to constitute a logical subset of 
the views expressed in Judge Hardiman’s opinion, which was 
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As a result, despite the declaration in Binderup to the contrary, 
I do not think Marks requires us to treat the multifactor test as 
controlling authority.5 
B 
Nevertheless, like the District Court, I believe that the 
multifactor test should guide the Step One analysis in this case. 
On my reading, the four factors reflect an underlying logic that 
is consistent with our precedent in Barton and Binderup. Those 
cases require us to assess the relation between the challenger’s 
“circumstances [and] those of persons historically barred from 
Second Amendment protections.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 174; see 
also Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346-47 (plurality opinion); id. at 
366 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgments). This comparative exercise demands certain 
measures of “seriousness,” and those measures should 
naturally be the features—the classification, elements, and 
punishments—common to the crimes that traditionally have 
qualified the individuals convicted of them for firearm 
dispossession. These crimes include felonies, crimes of 
                                              
the other concurring opinion in Binderup. It is difficult to see 
how this is the case. 
5 Nor has any subsequent precedential opinion of this Court 
resolved this difficulty by adopting that test. Only three of this 
Court’s precedential opinions cite Binderup. None concerns an 
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). See Beers, 927 F.3d 150; 
United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2019); Ass’n 
of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Attorney Gen. New Jersey, 910 
F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018). However, one recent non-precedential 
opinion confronting an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) has 
declared the multifactor test controlling authority. See King v. 
Attorney Gen. of the United States, No. 18-2571, 2019 WL 
3335135, at *2 & n.2 (3d Cir. July 25, 2019). 
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violence, and (as Binderup held)6 some nonviolent 
misdemeanors. Further, because neither courts nor scholars 
have agreed on the precise contours of this category—and in 
particular how “longstanding” a regulation must be for its 
violators to be considered part of the historically barred class, 
see, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640-41 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha 
Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 
(2009)—the multifactor test has the virtue of permitting a 
number of different measures of “seriousness” without making 
any one factor dispositive. 
A methodical evaluation of each factor, consistent with 
this logic, compels the conclusion reached by the District 
Court: that Holloway’s conduct has not removed him from the 
scope of Second Amendment protection. In conducting this 
analysis, I shall also address the majority’s additional 
considerations—the “potential for danger and risk of harm” 
posed by the challenger’s crime, Majority Op. at II.B.2, and the 
maximum level of punishment Pennsylvania imposes for 
Holloway’s second DUI offense, id. While, as noted, I do not 
dispute that the majority may supplement the four factors, any 
such additions must be—as the four factors are—consistent 
with the comparative exercise required by Barton and 
Binderup.7 
                                              
6 See 836 F.3d at 348–49 (plurality opinion); id. at 387–88 
(Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and 
dissenting from the judgments) 
7 According to the majority, I argue that “our considerations of 
who falls within the historically barred class must be tied to 
Barton, and in particular ‘the presence of force or violence in 
the challenger’s conduct,’” Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.11. Yet that 
is not my argument. At multiple points in this opinion I note 
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1 
The first factor asks whether the challenger’s crime is a 
felony or a misdemeanor. The majority acknowledges that 
Pennsylvania classifies Holloway’s second DUI offense as a 
misdemeanor, but it points out that the offense “carries . . . a 
five-year maximum prison term.” Majority Op. at II.B.2. Yet, 
under our precedent, the potential prison term cannot nullify 
the relevance of the felony/misdemeanor distinction for 
determining whether a crime is “serious” enough to deprive an 
individual of his Second Amendment right. A common feature 
of the crimes that traditionally have barred an individual from 
owning a firearm is that they are classified as felonies. 
For example, in Heller, the Supreme Court warned 
specifically that its opinion should not be read to question 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 
(2008) (emphasis added); see also McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
                                              
that because of the indefinite nature of the historically barred 
class, no one factor can be dispositive. I assert, rather, that the 
relevant factors may not be any ones we choose—they must 
aid the determination of whether the challenger’s crime is 
sufficiently similar to those of the persons historically barred 
from firearm possession. This certainly involves historical 
analysis (which the majority also engages in), but, as I 
mentioned above and restate below, it additionally includes 
looking to other measures relevant to making the comparison. 
My point, as I go on to detail, is that the majority has given too 
much weight to considerations that, however compelling in 
other contexts, are irrelevant to the comparative analysis that 
the majority itself acknowledges we must conduct. See id. at 
II.A & n.4. 
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Congress itself recognized the relevance of the distinction 
when it excluded from § 922(g)(1)’s reach misdemeanors 
punishable by imprisonment of two years or less. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(20)(B). If, as the majority suggests, the maximum 
length of the sentence rather than the classification of the crime 
is what really matters, then Congress would never have made 
an exception for misdemeanors alone. It would either have 
amended § 922(g)(1) to cover all crimes punishable by more 
than two years’ incarceration or never added § 921(a)(20)(B) 
in the first place.8 
                                              
8 To the extent one gives it validity, the legislative history 
confirms this interpretation. In 1961, Congress amended the 
precursor of § 922(g)(1) to prevent the transportation or receipt 
of a firearm by all persons convicted of any “crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—not just 
persons convicted of a “crime of violence,” as had previously 
been the case. See Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 
Stat. 757, 757 (1961). In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
however, Congress amended §§ 921 and 922 to their present 
form. See Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). The House 
bill would have maintained the existing broad language 
covering all crimes—both felonies and misdemeanors—
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. See H.R. 
17735, 90th Cong. § 2 (1968). By contrast, the Senate bill 
would have made it “unlawful for any person . . . convicted in 
any court of a crime punishable as a felony” to transport or 
receive any firearm. S. 3633, 90th Cong. § 102 (1968). The 
Conference Report noted this discrepancy, declaring the 
compromise to be the maintenance of the House language in § 
922(g)(1), but adding what became § 921(a)(20)(B). See H.R. 
REP. NO. 90-1956, at 28-29 (1968) (Conf. Rep.). Thus, in 
creating our current regime, Congress not only wanted to 
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Further, the classification of a crime as a felony has 
profound implications for whether a person may possess a 
firearm under state law. On my assessment, thirty-two out of 
fifty-one jurisdictions (the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia) disarm individuals because of a felony conviction.9 
That is, they bar for at least some time the possession of a 
                                              
include misdemeanors as well as felonies in the reach of the 
law, but also drew a distinction between the two types of 
crimes. 
9 See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(1) (2019); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-904(A)(5) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-
103(a)(1) (2019); CAL. PENAL CODE § 29800(a)(1) (West 
2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-108(1) (2019); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-217(a)(1) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
1448(a)(1) (2019); D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(a)(2) (2019); FLA. 
STAT. § 790.23(1) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7(b) (2019); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.1(a) (2019); IND. CODE § 35-47-
2-3(h) (2019); IOWA CODE § 724.26(1) (2019); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-6304(a) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.040(1) 
(West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-622(b) (West 
2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(d)(i)(A) (2019); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224f(1) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 
97-37-5(1) (2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070.1(1) (2019); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1206(1)(a)(i), (2) (2019); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 202.360(1)(b) (2019); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 
(2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-16(A)(1) (2019); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 400.00(1)(c) (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
415.1(a) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1283(A) (2019); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
46.04(a) (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2(A) (2019); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040(2)(a)(i) (2019); WIS. STAT. § 
941.29(1m) (2019). 
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firearm precisely because the person was convicted of a crime 
labeled a felony. The distinction therefore matters for defining 
the historically barred class, regardless of jurisdictional 
diversity in the sentence ranges for various crimes. 
As noted, in evaluating the relevance of the 
felony/misdemeanor distinction, the majority lends great 
weight to the maximum punishment that Pennsylvania imposes 
for Holloway’s offense. See Majority Op. at II.B.2. However, 
a majority of the en banc Court in Binderup rejected the 
significance of that consideration. As Judge Ambro noted 
there, prohibitions on the possession of firearms by criminals 
are only “presumptively lawful.” Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350 
(opinion of Ambro, J.) (emphasis added) (citing Heller, 554 
U.S. at 626-27 & n.26), and in the absence of an explicit 
declaration to the contrary, all presumptions are rebuttable. To 
hold otherwise would constitute “an end-run around the 
Second Amendment,” in effect subjecting such prohibitions to 
rational-basis review rather than the heightened scrutiny 
demanded when a constitutional right is at stake. Id. at 351-52. 
As a result, the maximum possible sentence for Holloway’s 
crime, although a valid consideration, cannot detract from the 
relevance of a factor that is consistent with our precedent in 
Barton and Binderup.10 
                                              
10 I do not, as the majority suggests, read Binderup as 
“reject[ing] consideration of a maximum penalty in favor of 
the felony/misdemeanor label.” Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.13. 
Rather, my point is that the majority cannot invoke the 
maximum penalty to discount the relevance of a factor 
consistent with the comparative exercise Barton and Binderup 
require us to conduct. The dissent in Binderup would have held 
the challengers’ crimes “serious” simply because they carry 
maximum prison terms exceeding those provided in §§ 
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In saying this, I do not question the Pennsylvania 
legislature’s judgment that an offense such as Holloway’s 
should be punishable by a lengthy prison term. But for the 
purposes of answering the question before us today—whether 
that offense is “serious” enough to deprive Holloway of his 
Second Amendment right—we must look to how his offense 
compares with those of the historically barred class. That 
involves giving weight to the felony/misdemeanor distinction. 
In addition to the sentence it permitted, the Pennsylvania 
legislature also chose to punish Holloway’s crime as a 
misdemeanor. Indeed, the sentence and the classification are 
inseparable—all such misdemeanors in Pennsylvania carry 
Holloway’s maximum possible prison term. See 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 1104(1) (2019). Even as a simple matter of statutory 
interpretation, then, the classification of the crime matters. This 
factor therefore weighs in Holloway’s favor. 
                                              
921(a)(20)(B) and 922(g)(1). See 836 F.3d at 388 (Fuentes, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the 
judgments). A majority of the judges rejected such a 
categorical approach—and that is a key reason why Binderup 
came out as it did. The maximum penalty and the 
felony/misdemeanor distinction cannot, therefore, be treated as 
mutually exclusive. For this same reason, I agree with the 
majority that the maximum punishment is probative of the 
offense’s “seriousness.” See Majority Op. at II.B.2. But I think 
that fact should be considered under the fourth factor—how 
United States jurisdictions generally punish the offense. It is 
important, for purposes of the Barton and Binderup 
comparison, whether the challenger’s maximum punishment 
reflects a jurisdictional consensus or is an outlier. 
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2 
The second factor asks whether the “[c]hallenger’s 
offense had the use or attempted use of force as an element.” 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 352 (opinion of Ambro, J.). The majority 
concedes that Holloway’s DUI offense does not fulfill this 
criterion, see Majority Op. at II.B.2, but it supplements its 
analysis by considering the crime’s “potential for danger and 
risk of harm to self and others,” id. Although the Marks rule 
does not foreclose additions to the multifactor test by a panel 
majority, our precedent demands that the “seriousness” inquiry 
be a comparative exercise involving the challenger’s offense 
and the characteristic features of those crimes that traditionally 
have disqualified persons from owning firearms. The virtue of 
the second Binderup factor is that it crystallizes in a clear legal 
standard the evident historical concern with force and violence. 
By contrast, the relevant historical and contemporary 
authorities do not support a standard focusing on all conduct 
that poses a “potential for danger and risk of harm to self and 
others.” Id. 
The most prominent late eighteenth-century sources 
supporting legislative power to bar certain individuals from 
owning firearms are the proposals made in the ratifying 
conventions of Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and 
Massachusetts. The first of these provides that “no law shall be 
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for 
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from 
individuals.” THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE 
MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION, OF THE STATE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA, TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS 1 (Phila., E. Oswald 
1787), https://www.loc.gov/item/90898134. It is important to 
note that the two categories are interlocking—the provision 
captures both convicted criminals and those non-criminals who 
pose a “real danger of public injury.” Id. The inclusion of the 
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latter phrase in turn suggests that the drafters did not 
necessarily have in mind all crimes, but rather those that 
manifest a real danger to the public. To this extent, I agree with 
the majority’s reading of the text. See Majority Op. at II.B.2 
n.11. 
Yet the provision alone does not tell us what “real 
danger of public injury” means. Perhaps the best way of 
interpreting this historical term is to look to the dispossessory 
provisions proposed at the other two conventions. In voting to 
ratify the Federal Constitution, New Hampshire’s delegates 
also recommended certain amendments to it. Among these was 
a provision that “Congress shall never disarm any citizen, 
unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion.” 1 
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 326 (2d ed. 1836). Although the Pennsylvania 
minority’s “real danger of public injury” was likely meant to 
sweep more broadly than New Hampshire’s “in actual 
rebellion,” insofar as we are attempting to discover the 
limitations the ratifying public would have implicitly placed on 
the Second Amendment, the New Hampshire provision 
suggests a concern with armed conflict or violence against the 
government, rather than with all dangerous acts. In this 
context, it is noteworthy that the Pennsylvania minority speaks 
of the danger of public, rather than private, injury—a 
distinction it explicitly makes elsewhere in the document. See, 
e.g., ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT, at 3 (“The absolute 
unqualified command that congress have over the militia may 
be made instrumental to the destruction of all liberty, both 
public and private . . . .”). From this perspective, it appears the 
Pennsylvania antifederalists had in mind something narrower 
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than the majority’s standard of “risk of harm to self and 
others.”11 
                                              
11 The majority does not discuss the New Hampshire proposal. 
Nevertheless, it declares this reading of the Pennsylvania 
minority’s Address “foreclosed by our precedent” in Beers. 
Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.11. It is unclear, though, how Beers’s 
interpretation constitutes binding precedent. Beers used the 
phrase “real danger of public injury” to hold in part “that the 
traditional justification for disarming mentally ill individuals 
was that they were considered dangerous to themselves and/or 
to the public at large.” 927 F.3d at 158. By its very terms, this 
holding applies to the mentally ill, not to those convicted of 
crimes. To the extent Beers found the phrase to apply to all 
persons who present a danger to themselves or the public at 
large, that finding is dicta. Alternatively, if an interpretation of 
“real danger of public injury” can apply precedentially beyond 
the context in which it is invoked, then Beers was in fact bound 
by Barton’s interpretation, which found the phrase to cover 
“those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” See 633 
F.3d at 173. It cannot plausibly be argued that Binderup 
overruled this aspect of Barton, since the Binderup plurality 
opinion emphasized the phrase “crimes committed,” which 
precedes “real danger of public injury” in the Address, and 
suggested that it was the operative language covering 
nonviolent offenses. See 836 F.3d at 349 (plurality opinion). 
Further, the plurality opinion explicitly stated that it was 
overruling Barton “[t]o the extent” that Barton “holds that 
people convicted of serious crimes may regain their lost 
Second Amendment rights after not posing a threat to society 
for a period of time.” Id. at 350. On any reading, then, the 
majority is incorrect to suggest that Beers requires us to 
interpret “real danger of public injury” as it does. 
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This understanding is also found in Samuel Adams’s 
proposal to the Massachusetts ratifying convention. The 
Constitution, he suggested, should never be “construed to 
authorize Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United 
States who are peaceable citizens from keeping their own 
arms.” 3 WILLIAM V. WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES 
OF SAMUEL ADAMS 267 (Bos., Little, Brown & Co. 1865). 
What Adams meant by “peaceable” can be determined from 
the rest of his proposal. He also thought the Constitution should 
not be construed “to prevent the people from petitioning, in a 
peaceable and orderly manner, the Federal Legislature for a 
redress of grievances.” Id. The right to keep arms was linked 
to the assembly and petitioning right not only in Adams’s 
proposal but also in the Bill of Rights itself. To many late-
eighteenth-century Americans, the arms right in the Second 
Amendment helped to ensure that the liberties guaranteed in 
the First Amendment would not be eroded by a tyrannical 
central government. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 47-48 (1998). 
Thus, in both Adams’s proposal and the Bill of Rights, it is “the 
people” who are given the right to petition their government 
and to possess arms. That entity, of course, is the one that (as 
the Preamble declares) alone has the power to form the 
government, and concomitantly to alter or abolish it. In this 
context, “peaceable” refers to those individuals who remain a 
part of “the people,” and do not independently disturb or take 
up arms against its legitimate government. Only “the people” 
itself has that ability. 
In sum, the principal historical evidence from the 
Founding period suggests that the majority’s “risk of harm” 
standard is too broad to serve as a basis for comparison under 
our precedent. The correct standard appears to be something 
closer to the one used in Binderup, focusing on the presence of 
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force or violence in the challenger’s conduct. Notably, in a part 
of Barton that remains good law, our Court summarized the 
ratifying convention proposals as “confirm[ing] that the 
common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to 
those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” 633 F.3d at 
173 (emphasis added); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 
456 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (concluding that 
“[t]he concern common to all three” proposals is “threatened 
violence and the risk of public injury”).12 
Further, although the majority cites contemporary 
authorities to support its standard, these seem to me inapt for 
conducting the comparison required by Barton and Binderup. 
On my reading, the majority principally relies on an inference 
from a colloquial understanding of drunk driving’s 
                                              
12 Additional historical evidence from after the Founding 
further undercuts the majority’s position. For one, scholars 
have found little evidence of categorical bans on firearm 
possession in the nineteenth century. The principal means of 
gun control in this period appear to have been public-carry 
laws. See Saul Cornell, The Right to Keep and Carry Arms in 
Anglo-American Law: Preserving Liberty and Keeping the 
Peace, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 33-43 (2017); 
Marshall, supra, at 710-12. In addition, although firearm 
dispossession laws became increasingly prevalent in the early 
twentieth century, even these foundational statutes cannot 
support the majority’s standard. For example, the original 
version of § 922(g)(1) made it unlawful for any person 
“convicted of a crime of violence” to transport or receive a 
firearm. Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 75-785, § 2, 52 Stat. 
1250, 1251 (1938) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 902 (1940)). On the 
background to the Federal Firearms Act’s “crime of violence” 
provision, see Marshall, supra, at 700-07. 
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“seriousness” to that offense’s “seriousness” for purposes of 
depriving a person of Second Amendment protection. See 
Majority Op. at II.B.2. This is a category mistake. If we 
conducted a poll of a representative sample of Americans, 
asking them whether drunk driving is a serious crime, it is 
likely that most would answer affirmatively. Such an appeal to 
ordinary meaning has legal purchase in the context of statutory 
interpretation because a court there confronts words as adopted 
by a procedurally established majority of the people’s elected 
representatives. But “serious” for present purposes is not a 
statutory, let alone a constitutional, term. It is how a majority 
of this Circuit’s judges in Binderup summarized the crimes that 
historically have deprived persons convicted of them of the 
right to own a firearm. “Serious,” therefore, has a discrete legal 
meaning, and the “seriousness” inquiry must be given content 
consistent with that meaning. It is a determination of whether 
a challenger’s offense is sufficiently similar to those committed 
by the historically barred class. Evaluation of the second factor 
should be grounded in this legal framework. 
Given the indeterminate nature of the historically barred 
class, I do not dispute that current authorities may assist us in 
measuring the “seriousness” of a challenger’s offense. But any 
such measurement must be consistent with our precedent. To 
me, the most relevant contemporary authorities for measuring 
“seriousness” are in fact included in the third and fourth 
factors: the actors within the criminal-justice system who 
confronted the challenger’s offense and imposed a punishment, 
and the jurisdictions that penalize the challenger’s conduct as 
a crime. As a result, I must conclude that the second factor 
weighs in Holloway’s favor. 
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3 
Although the preceding factors support Holloway, they 
are insufficient in themselves to establish whether he is entitled 
to Second Amendment protection. Because a majority of the 
judges in Binderup held that a nonviolent misdemeanor may 
be “serious,” the preceding factors, while probative measures 
of “seriousness,” are not dispositive. Yet in the absence of 
common features of “serious” nonviolent misdemeanors—and 
Binderup did not specify any—we must compare the 
punishment for the challenger’s crime with the punishments 
for the crimes of the historically barred class. See 836 F.3d at 
352 (opinion of Ambro, J.). The third and fourth Binderup 
factors both accomplish this end.13 
The third factor looks to the sentence the challenger 
received. It directs our attention to the unique circumstances of 
the challenger’s offense and conviction. Holloway was 
arrested in January 2005 after a police officer witnessed him 
driving the wrong way down a one-way street. Holloway, 349 
F. Supp. 3d at 454. He registered a blood alcohol concentration 
(BAC) at the “highest rate” under Pennsylvania law, and 
because this was his second DUI offense, he was convicted of 
                                              
13 The majority says that “in addition to ascribing high value to 
the offense’s felony/misdemeanor label,” I “favor[]” a focus 
“on the actual penalty imposed.” Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.12. It 
contrasts this view with its own, declaring it “proper to 
consider the maximum penalty an offender faces, and not 
simply” these other factors. Id. As I have noted, however, I do 
not value any one factor above another, and in fact agree with 
the majority that the maximum penalty is relevant, though (for 
the reasons I state below) I think that such a penalty is most 
appropriately, for purposes of the Barton and Binderup 
comparison, considered under the fourth factor. 
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a first-degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to five years in 
prison. Id. However, he received the mandatory minimum 
sentence, which included three months of confinement on a 
work-release program. Id. 454-55. 
The majority finds this factor against Holloway, 
emphasizing that, unlike the challengers in Binderup, he 
received a punishment that deprived him of his liberty. See 
Majority Op. at II.B.2. While this fact is certainly evidence that 
Pennsylvania considers Holloway’s offense more significant 
than that of Binderup (which was also committed in 
Pennsylvania), it does not measure Holloway’s offense against 
those of the historically barred class. A factor that considers the 
punishment received suggests some deference to the decisions 
of those within the criminal-justice system. See Binderup, 836 
F.3d at 352 (opinion of Ambro, J.) (“[P]unishments are selected 
by judges who have firsthand knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances of the cases and who likely have the benefit of 
pre-sentence reports prepared by trained professionals.”). 
Here, the actors on the ground did not deem Holloway’s 
offense “serious” enough to warrant the maximum penalty that 
Pennsylvania law permitted. Rather, the sentencing judge 
imposed the lightest punishment that the law allowed—a term 
of imprisonment, with work release, considerably shorter than 
the qualifying sentences under either § 922(g)(1) or § 
921(a)(20)(B). As the District Court noted, Holloway’s 
assignment to a work-release program “undergirds the 
relatively minor nature of his sentence and suggests that the 
sentencing judge did not find Holloway to pose a significant 
risk to public safety.” Holloway, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 457. 
For the purposes of the Barton and Binderup 
comparison, then, I conclude that those who administered 
Pennsylvania’s law did not deem Holloway’s offense “serious” 
enough to merit imposition of a sentence on a par with those of 
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the historically barred class. The argument that Holloway’s 
punishment was greater than anything received by the 
Binderup challengers bears more on the final factor than on the 
present one. The latter supports Holloway’s claim to Second 
Amendment protection. 
4 
The fourth factor asks whether there is a “cross-
jurisdictional consensus regarding the seriousness of the 
[challenger’s] crime[].” Id. Like the sentence actually received, 
the challenger’s maximum possible punishment similarly 
provides a point of comparison with the historically barred 
class, but it cannot be assessed by looking to the challenger’s 
jurisdiction alone. The fact that the challenger’s crime is 
punishable by more than one or two years is the very reason he 
is in court; it demonstrates only that one jurisdiction has chosen 
to punish his conduct on terms comparable to the punishments 
of the historically barred class. More significant is how 
jurisdictions generally punish the challenger’s conduct because 
such a measure permits a comparison of current appraisal of 
the significance of the challenger’s crime with the punishments 
imposed on the historical class. 
My review of the DUI laws in all fifty states and the 
District of Columbia reveals a notable consensus in how these 
jurisdictions punish Holloway’s conduct. Most importantly, 
only twelve of these jurisdictions punish such conduct with a 
maximum term of imprisonment exceeding one year.14 Of 
                                              
14 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227a, 53a-25, 53a-26 (2019); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 4177; tit. 11, § 233 (2019); IND. 
CODE §§ 9-30-5-1, 9-30-5-3 (2019); IOWA CODE § 321J.2 
(2019); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §§ 21-902, 27-101 to -102 
(West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24; ch. 274, § 1 
 22 
 
these twelve jurisdictions, seven provide for a maximum 
punishment exceeding two years,15 and only four of these 
seven classify such a crime as a misdemeanor.16 The other three 
jurisdictions, as well as the remaining five that punish the 
crime by more than one year of imprisonment, classify it as a 
felony. Given these statistics, there is no cross-jurisdictional 
consensus that a second DUI offense with a BAC at 0.192% is 
“serious” for purposes of Second Amendment analysis. In fact, 
the consensus lies in the other direction: a significant majority 
of jurisdictions—thirty-nine out of fifty-one—do not consider 
Holloway’s second DUI offense to be a crime worthy of 
punishment in accord with that of a traditional felony. 
                                              
(2019); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192-1193 (McKinney 
2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-138.1, 20-138.5, 20-179 (2019); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902 (2019); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
3803(b)(4), 3804 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1104 (2019); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, 16-1-20, 16-1-100 
(2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1201, 1210; tit. 13, § 1 
(2019). 
15 See IND. CODE §§ 9-30-5-1, 9-30-5-3 (2019); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 90, § 24; ch. 274, § 1 (2019); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. 
LAW §§ 1192-1193 (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-
138.1, 20-138.5, 20-179 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902 
(2019); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3803(b)(4), 3804 (2019); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 1104 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-2930, 56-
5-2933, 16-1-20, 16-1-100 (2019). 
16 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24; ch. 274, § 1 (2019); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 20-138.1, 20-138.5, 20-179 (2019); 75 PA. 
CONS. STAT. §§ 3803(b)(4), 3804 (2019); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 1104 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, 16-
1-20, 16-1-100 (2019). 
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The majority finds it sufficient that “states unanimously 
agree that DUIs are crimes subject to punishment.” Majority 
Op. at II.B.2. Yet as I have emphasized, our precedent dictates 
that the relevant measures of “seriousness” are those indicating 
how the challenger’s circumstances compare with the 
circumstances of the historically barred class. The fact of 
punishment alone should not render a crime “serious” enough 
to deprive an individual of a constitutional right. In the light of 
the evidence presented above, I must conclude that under the 
fourth factor, Holloway is not removed from the scope of 
Second Amendment protection. 
*** 
Drunk driving is a dangerous crime. Declaring it not 
“serious” for purposes of the Second Amendment in no way 
detracts from its “seriousness” in the ordinary understanding 
of that word. But that is my point—the two categories are 
distinct, and our analysis should reflect that fact. Although 
Binderup did not create controlling precedent on the nature of 
the “seriousness” inquiry, the legal content of that inquiry must 
fulfill the requirements established in Barton and Binderup. 
Properly understood and applied, the multifactor test meets 
these demands. And in the context of the present case, it leads 
me to agree with the District Court that § 922(g)(1) burdens 
Holloway’s constitutional right to own a firearm. In this way, I 
part with the majority in this case. 
II 
If a court determines, as I do here, that the challenged 
law burdens protected conduct, then Marzzarella’s second step 
requires the court to “evaluate the law under some form of 
means-ends scrutiny.” 614 F.3d at 89. In Binderup, the same 
ten judges who agreed to adopt Marzzarella’s two-step 
framework and the “seriousness” standard also accepted the 
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application of intermediate scrutiny in as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1). See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 353 (opinion of Ambro, 
J.); id. at 398 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and dissenting from the judgments). Therefore, our precedent 
requires the application of intermediate scrutiny in the present 
case. See Donovan, 661 F.3d at 182. 
Following a long line of Supreme Court case law, 
Marzzarella enumerated two elements of intermediate-scrutiny 
review. First, the government interest in the enforcement of the 
challenged regulation must be “significant, substantial, or 
important.” 614 F.3d at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Second, there must be a “reasonable” fit between the asserted 
government interest and the regulation as written or applied. 
Id.; see also Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney 
Gen. New Jersey, 910 F.3d 106, 119 (3d Cir. 2018) (adopting 
this two-part test); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 
2013) (same). I will consider each in turn. 
A 
The parties do not contest that the government has a 
substantial interest in “protecting the public from people who 
cannot be trusted to use firearms responsibly.” Appellants’ Br. 
at 29. Neither Holloway’s brief nor the District Court’s opinion 
even mention this element. Thus, there is no reason to question 
whether the government has a substantial interest in enforcing 
§ 922(g)(1). 
B 
Our primary difficulty lies in determining how to apply 
the second element of intermediate-scrutiny review to § 
922(g)(1). Binderup established no precedent for how to decide 
whether there is a “[reasonable] fit between [§ 922(g)(1)] and 
the asserted governmental end.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98. 
Moreover, the standards applied by the judges in that case are 
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not the same as the standard applied by the Court in 
Marzzarella. Yet as I detail in Section II.B.1, these standards 
are in fact doctrinally consistent with each other. If the 
government presents sufficient evidence to support its 
enforcement of the regulation at issue, we are then to evaluate 
how closely the regulation has been drawn to advance that 
interest. This is the standard I apply in Section II.B.2, 
concluding that § 922(g)(1) as applied in the present case fails 
intermediate scrutiny. 
1 
There is no binding precedent in our Circuit for the 
proper application of intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1). In 
Binderup, the opinion announcing the Court’s judgment said 
the government “must ‘present some meaningful evidence, not 
mere assertions, to justify its predictive . . . judgments’” 
regarding the danger presented by the challengers and others 
like them. 836 F.3d at 354 (opinion of Ambro, J.) (quoting 
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 
2011)). By contrast, in Marzzarella, the Court held that 18 
U.S.C. § 922(k) “fits reasonably with [the government’s 
asserted] interest in that it reaches only conduct creating a 
substantial risk of rendering a firearm untraceable.” 614 F.3d 
at 98. Whereas in Binderup, then, the judges were concerned 
with the evidence the government put forward, in Marzzarella 
the Court focused on the relation between the government’s 
asserted interest and the statute’s actual operation.17 
Despite this ostensible difference, these standards are in 
fact consistent with each other as a doctrinal matter. 
                                              
17 For the same reasons given above with regard to the 
multifactor test, I do not think the application of intermediate 
scrutiny in Binderup is binding precedent under the Marks rule. 
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Marzzarella followed Heller in looking to the Supreme Court’s 
First Amendment case law for guidance, calling that doctrine 
“the natural choice” for “evaluating Second Amendment 
challenges.” 614 F.3d at 89 n.4. In particular, for the second 
prong of intermediate-scrutiny review—that “the fit between 
the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be 
reasonable, not perfect”—Marzzarella referred to two of the 
Supreme Court’s commercial-speech cases. See id. at 98 
(citing Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 
(2001); and Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 480 (1989)). A brief consideration of commercial-speech 
doctrine allows us to see how our Circuit’s Second Amendment 
precedent in fact dictates a single standard for subjecting § 
922(g)(1) to intermediate scrutiny.18 
The Supreme Court applies a four-step test for 
determining whether a regulation of commercial speech 
violates the First Amendment. A court must first “determine 
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment,” 
and then “ask whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial.” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also Fox, 492 
U.S. at 475. If the answer to both inquires is affirmative, the 
government must then show “that the statute directly advances 
a substantial governmental interest and that the measure is 
drawn to achieve that interest.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 
                                              
18 The majority suggests that I am “advocating that we import” 
the commercial-speech standard into the § 922(g)(1) context. 
Majority Op. at II.B.2 n.16. To the contrary, I am simply 
applying our precedent, mindful that Marzzarella has “guided 
how we approach as-applied Second Amendment challenges.” 
Binderup, 836 F.3d at 346 (plurality opinion). 
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U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (citing Fox, 492 U.S. at 480-81; and Cent. 
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566). 
This test bears notable resemblance to our Circuit’s 
developing Second Amendment doctrine. For our purposes 
here, the third and fourth steps are especially remarkable: they 
resemble the standards applied in Binderup and Marzzarella, 
respectively. Both are essential means of measuring the fit 
between the interest and the regulation. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has said that these steps are not necessarily distinct 
inquiries. In as-applied challenges, the question posed at step 
three “cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether 
the governmental interest is directly advanced as applied to a 
single person or entity.” United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 
U.S. 418, 427 (1993). The court must also consider “the 
regulation’s general application to others” with the same 
relevant characteristics as the challenger. Id. As a result, the 
validity of the regulation’s application to the challenger 
“properly should be dealt with under the fourth factor of the 
Central Hudson test.” Id. This means that, regardless of the 
nature of the challenge, the third and fourth steps “basically 
involve a consideration of the fit between the legislature’s ends 
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends.” Id. at 427-28 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
This background clarifies the standard to apply in the 
present case. In effect, Binderup concerned the correct 
application of the third step—whether the regulation “directly 
advances a substantial governmental interest.” Sorrell, 564 
U.S. at 572. The three-judge opinion announcing the judgment 
of the Court did not need to advance its inquiry any further, 
because it concluded that § 922(g)(1) already failed as applied. 
In Marzzarella, however, there was no question whether the 
government had presented sufficient evidence to justify its 
enforcement action, and so the Court looked to how closely § 
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922(k) was drawn to achieve the government’s stated interest, 
holding that the statute is not impermissibly overinclusive 
because “it reaches only conduct creating a substantial risk of 
rendering a firearm untraceable.” 614 F.3d at 98. As a result, to 
my mind Binderup and Marzzarella are doctrinally consistent, 
or at least reconcilable, in the light of how the Supreme Court 
has elaborated the final two steps of the commercial-speech 
test. At Marzzarella Step Two, if we are satisfied with the 
evidence supporting the statute’s application, we must then 
consider how closely the statute has been drawn to advance the 
government’s substantial interest. 
2 
Applying that standard in the present case, I conclude 
that § 922(g)(1) does not survive intermediate scrutiny. I 
disagree with the District Court, however, that the government 
has failed to produce evidence demonstrating that its 
enforcement of the statute directly advances its stated 
substantial interest. Rather, the flaw with the government’s 
case is that the statute as applied here is “wildly 
underinclusive.” Nat’l Inst. Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)). 
a 
In finding that § 922(g)(1)’s enforcement in this case 
does not directly advance the government’s substantial 
interest, the District Court demanded an excessively 
particularized connection between the evidence proffered and 
Holloway’s circumstances. Yet, as explained above, we should 
not limit our “inquiry to whether the governmental interest is 
directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity,” but 
also consider “the regulation’s general application to others.” 
Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. at 427. The government’s studies in 
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Binderup were “obviously distinguishable.” 836 F.3d at 354 
(opinion of Ambro, J.). They concerned the likelihood of 
incarcerated felons to reoffend, though the Binderup 
challengers were neither incarcerated nor felons under state 
law. And the studies cited recidivism rates not applicable to 
individuals in the challengers’ situation. More compelling 
studies would have presented evidence relating to individuals 
“with the Challengers’ backgrounds.” Id. at 355. 
The government’s expert report in the present case does 
exactly that. It offers evidence relating to the features of 
Holloway’s biography that are at issue in this case. It refers to 
the likelihood of drug and alcohol abuse among repeat DUI 
offenders. D. Ct. Docket No. 61-4, at 4. It refers to firearm 
purchasers with prior alcohol-related convictions. Id. at 9. 
These are the features of Holloway’s biography at issue here. 
For the purposes of government policy, barring individuals 
with those characteristics from possessing a firearm is 
reasonable. 
b 
As explained above, our inquiry into “reasonable fit” 
does not end here. The question is not merely whether it is 
reasonable to disarm the challenger because of his conviction, 
but whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the 
asserted objective [is] reasonable.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 
(emphasis added). As a result, we must consider, in the context 
of this as-applied challenge, how closely § 922(g)(1) has been 
drawn to achieve the government’s substantial interest. 
Under this standard, the law appears to be significantly 
underinclusive. Holloway’s crimes—a first DUI offense at a 
BAC of 0.131%, and a second DUI offense less than three 
years later with a BAC of 0.192%—implicate § 922(g)(1) in 
only eight of fifty-one jurisdictions (the fifty states and the 
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District of Columbia).19 These eight jurisdictions account for 
approximately 21% of the United States population.20 On 
average, then, only about one in five individuals behaving 
exactly as Holloway did would be barred from possessing a 
firearm under § 922(g)(1). The statute’s dependence on state 
criminal classifications and punishments results in an 
underinclusive application that raises constitutional concerns, 
regardless of the reasonableness of disarming recidivist DUI 
offenders. 
                                              
19 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227a, 53a-25, 53a-26 (2019); 
IND. CODE §§ 9-30-5-1, 9-30-5-3 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
90, § 24; ch. 274, § 1 (2019); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 1192-
1193 (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-138.1, 20-
138.5, 20-179 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 11-902 (2019); 75 
PA. CONS. STAT. § 3804 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-5-2930, 
56-5-2933, 16-1-20, 16-1-100 (2019). 
20 I base this number on the U.S. Census Bureau’s estimated 
2019 national and state populations. The estimated population 
of the fifty states and the District of Columbia on July 1, 2019 
was 328,239,523 persons. See U.S. Census Bureau, National 
Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2019, 
U.S. DEP’T COM. (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-national-total.html. On that same 
date, the total estimated population of the eight states where 
Holloway’s crimes would implicate § 922(g)(1) was 
69,039,328 persons. See U.S. Census Bureau, State Population 
Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2019, U.S. DEP’T 
COM. (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-state-total.html. 
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c 
The next question is whether this underinclusivity 
renders § 922(g)(1) as applied here unconstitutional under 
intermediate scrutiny. To my mind, there are two principal 
counterarguments to answering this question affirmatively. 
Both of them fail. 
First, it might be argued that our precedent remains 
unsettled regarding whether underinclusivity is a valid 
consideration in the Second Amendment context. Although 
Marzzarella allowed that a regulation’s “underinclusiveness 
can be evidence that the interest is not significant enough to 
justify the regulation,” 614 F.3d at 99, the Court was there 
referring to underinclusivity in the context of strict, rather than 
intermediate, scrutiny. As a result, a future panel majority may 
reject a consideration of underinclusivity in intermediate-
scrutiny review. See, e.g., Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, 
910 F.3d at 122 n.28 (“While our Court has consulted First 
Amendment jurisprudence concerning the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply to a gun regulation, we have not wholesale 
incorporated it into the Second Amendment.” (citations 
omitted)). 
Yet, in constitutional law, underinclusivity follows 
necessarily from the evaluation of a fit between means and 
ends. And in Marzzarella we explicitly adopted a test that 
considers “the fit between the challenged regulation and the 
asserted objective.” 614 F.3d at 98; see also Reilly, 533 U.S. at 
556; Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995); 
Fox, 492 U.S. at 480. The assessment of fit looks to the relation 
between the class of persons who come within the scope of the 
regulation’s stated objective, and the class of persons actually 
affected by the regulation. See, e.g., Joseph Tussman & 
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. 
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L. REV. 341, 344-53 (1949).21 Under this standard, what 
matters is not whether a regulation is specifically 
overinclusive, but rather by how much it is either over- or 
underinclusive. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery 
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (holding a city 
ordinance intended to advance safety and aesthetic interests 
unconstitutional because it unjustifiably affected only a small 
fraction of operating newsracks, thus constituting an 
unreasonable fit between ends and means). 
This generalized inquiry encompasses both 
intermediate and strict scrutiny. The difference between those 
standards is the degree, rather than the type, of fit—whether 
the fit is either “reasonable” or “perfect.” Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 98; see McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 
185, 218 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“Even when the Court is 
not applying strict scrutiny, we still require ‘a fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; . . . that employs not 
necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired objective.’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 480)). Intermediate scrutiny 
                                              
21 The Court first developed this test in the equal-protection 
context, and subsequently imported it into First Amendment 
doctrine in the early 1970s. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a 
Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
20 (1975). It therefore makes sense that when our Court in 
Marzzarella began to formulate Second Amendment doctrine, 
it called for an evaluation of the challenged law “under some 
form of means-end scrutiny,” 614 F.3d at 89, and described that 
evaluation as an assessment of “the fit between the challenged 
regulation and the asserted objective,” id. at 98. 
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simply requires less of a fit between the governmental interest 
and the challenged regulation than strict scrutiny does. 
It would be contrary to the logic of this analysis to hold 
that under intermediate scrutiny alone a court may not consider 
a regulation’s underinclusivity. To be sure, there may be a 
compelling reason why the Second Amendment context 
precludes such a consideration, but, to my mind, even that 
determination must now be left either to this Court sitting en 
banc or to the Supreme Court. Because our Court in 
Marzzarella adopted a means-ends fit analysis, we have 
already decided that underinclusivity is at least a valid 
consideration. 
Second, it might be argued that § 922(g)(1) as applied 
here falls into one of the contexts in which the Supreme Court 
has upheld a regulation despite claims of underinclusivity. In 
particular, the Court has acknowledged two principal 
defenses—that a distinction drawn by a lawmaking body is in 
itself legitimate, and that a legislature is permitted to address a 
problem incrementally. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. 
Ct. 1656, 1668-69 (2015) (highlighting these two defenses); 
see also McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 
207-08 (2003) (“[R]eform may take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most 
acute to the legislative mind.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 105 (1976))); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 207 
(1992) (“States adopt laws to address the problems that 
confront them. The First Amendment does not require States to 
regulate for problems that do not exist.”). 
These defenses do not support § 922(g)(1) as applied in 
the present case. Congress has drawn no distinction between 
different types of conduct—the same behavior may activate § 
922(g)(1) or not based merely on where that behavior occurred. 
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See City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 428 (declaring a city 
ordinance unconstitutionally underinclusive under 
intermediate scrutiny “[b]ecause the distinction [the city] has 
drawn has absolutely no bearing on the interests it has 
asserted”). For this same reason, it is hard to see how the statute 
represents Congress addressing problems as they arise. Section 
922(g)(1) sweeps so broadly, covering any person convicted 
under state law of a felony or a misdemeanor carrying a 
sentence that exceeds two years, that in particular applications 
it is underinclusive, curtailing the constitutional rights of some 
and not others for the exact same conduct. Far from regulating 
for problems that do not exist, Congress is here not even 
regulating the vast majority of conduct it apparently deems 
problematic. 
*** 
Ultimately at stake in this case is whether the 
government may arbitrarily burden the constitutional right of 
some citizens and not others. This equality concern goes to the 
heart of constitutional adjudication, regardless of the nature of 
the right at issue. As Justice Jackson put it in a different 
context: 
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we 
should not forget today, that there is no more 
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose 
upon a minority must be imposed 
generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to 
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those 
officials to pick and choose only a few to whom 
they will apply legislation and thus to escape the 
political retribution that might be visited upon 
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them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can 
take no better measure to assure that laws will be 
just than to require that laws be equal in 
operation. 
Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). When a law, for reasons unrelated to 
enforcement discretion, on average punishes the same conduct 
only one in five times, such that those chosen individuals are 
deprived in perpetuity of a constitutional right, there is not a 
reasonable fit between the legislature’s asserted interest and 
the challenged regulation.22 If Congress wants to bar all 
individuals convicted of a second DUI offense with a BAC 
above 0.16% of owning a firearm, then it must do so through 
the ordinary channels of democratic lawmaking. At least then 
all persons’ constitutional right will be treated equally. 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                              
22 Although the majority does not reach Step Two, it observes 
that I “seemingly ask[] for a near-perfect fit.” Majority Op. at 
II.B.2 n.16. Reasonable minds may differ as to whether 
demanding a fit of greater than 21% is to demand near-
perfection. 
